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Political Asylum in the Ninth Circuit
and the Case of Elias-Zacarias
BRUCE J. EINHORN*
During the height of the Central American civil wars of the
1980s, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals established liberal pre-
cedent for granting asylum under the Immigration and National-
ity Act to deportable aliens who had been threatened for resisting
government or guerilla service in their native countries because of
their political opinions (including neutrality), whether expressed,
implied, or imputed to them by those who meant them harm.
However, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit and stated that an asylum applicant's political
opinion may not be imputed to him by the actions of his alleged
persecutors. In view of the Supreme Court's decision, and the
Ninth Circuit's ambiguous reaction to it in its recent case law, the
viability of the doctrine of implied and imputed political opinion
in asylum cases remains problematic in our increasingly violent,
Balkanized world.
I. INTRODUCTION
In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a Guatemalan guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a per-
son into its military services does not necessarily constitute "persecu-
tion on account of ... political opinion" under section 101 (a) (42) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 2 In so ruling, the Su-
preme Court reversed, or at least retarded, the recent trend in Ninth
* Bruce J. Einhorn is a United States Immigration Judge in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia and an adjunct professor of law at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. The
comments and views expressed in this article are those of the author, and not necessarily
those of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, United States Department of Jus-
tice, or of the Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)
(1988).
Circuit case law, begun in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,3 to grant asy-
lum to deportable aliens who have been threatened for resisting
guerrilla service on account of their political opinions (including neu-
trality), whether expressed or implied.
The following is a discussion of the immigration laws on asylum,
their application by the Ninth Circuit in cases of imputed political
opinion and coercive recruitment, and the impact of the Supreme
Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias. This discussion is not an attempt
to foretell with certainty the future of asylum adjudications. Rather,
it is an attempt to inspect the road already travelled and to signal
possible routes ahead in the area of asylum.
II. THE GENERAL LAW OF ASYLUM
A. Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
Section 208(a) of the INA provides that an "alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning
of section 101(a)(42)(A)." 4 Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA de-
fines "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion .... 6
Pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, "Immigration
Judges shall have exclusive jurisdiction over asylum applications
filed by an alien who has been served notice of referral to exclusion
proceedings under part 236 of this chapter, or served an order to
show cause [and thusly placed in deportation proceedings] under
part 242 of this chapter ....*"' Immigration judges have therefore
been delegated the Attorney General's authority in section 208(a) of
the INA to adjudicate alien's asylum applications. "The burden of
proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish that he is a refugee
as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act."'
3. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
4. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
5. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). This provision was
added to the INA by § 201(a) of the Refugee Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
94 Stat. 102 (1980).
6. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1992).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1992).
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B. Case Law Construction of "A Well-Founded Fear of
Persecution"
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,° the Supreme Court found that the
definition of "refugee" in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA is de-
rived from Chapter I, Article I, of the 1951 United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees.9 The Convention states:
the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who: . . . [a]s a result of
events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his na-
tionality and is unable to, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country .... 0
The Supreme Court found that "[t]he standard [of a well-founded
fear] as it has been consistently understood by those who drafted it,
as well as those drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly
does not require an alien to show that it is more likely than not that
he will be persecuted in order to be classified as a 'refugee.' "11
"There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for con-
cluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being
shot, tortured or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no 'well-
founded fear' of the event happening."12 Thus the Court grounded
proof of an alien's refugee status less on an exclusively objective
evaluation of his fear of prosecution and more on his subjective
mental state.' 3
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court upheld a Ninth Circuit decision
defining a "well-founded fear" as one that contained both objective
8. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
9. Id. at 437..The Court noted that "[a]Ithough the United States has never been
party to the 1951 Convention, it is a party to the Protocol [i.e., the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees], which incorporates the Convention's defini-
tion in relevant part. See 19 U.S.T. 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968)." Id. at 438 n.21.
10. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
i1. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438. By contrast, in INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407 (1984), the Court pointed out that "in enacting the 1980 [Refugee] Act Congress
did not amend the standard of eligibility for relief under § 243(h)." 480 U.S. at 430. The
INA states that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social.group, or political opinion." INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)
(1992). The Supreme Court in Stevic held that the requirement that "an applicant for
withholding of deportation [under § 243(h)] to demonstrate a 'clear probability of perse-
cution' upon deportation remained in force." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430.
12. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
13. Id. at 430.
and subjective components.' 4 The Ninth Circuit has expounded on
these components as follows: "A 'well-founded fear' contains both a
subjective component, requiring the fear to be genuine, and an objec-
tive component, which 'requires a showing, by credible, direct, and
specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reason-
able fear that the petitioner faces persecution.' "15
Like the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca, the Ninth Circuit viewed the
phrase "a well-founded fear of persecution" in light of United Na-
tions pronouncements on the subject of asylum.'6 Like the Ninth
Circuit, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees cau-
tioned asylum adjudicators that "[t]he term 'well-founded fear' con-
tains a subjective and an objective element, and you must consider
both in determining refugee status."'17
III. NINTH CIRCUIT VIEWS OF "PERSECUTION ON ACCOUNT
OF . . . POLITICAL OPINION"
Just as the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit broadened the bor-
ders of asylum with their definition of "a well-founded fear," so the
court of appeals expanded the reach of refugee status with its inter-
pretation of the phrase "persecution on account of ... political opin-
ion" contained in section 101(a) (42) (A) of the INA.
The court of appeals reached and grasped hold of the case of Ex-
pectation Bolanos-Hernandez, a deportable Salvadoran who both an
immigration judge and the United States Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) concluded was not entitled to political asylum even
though he had been threatened by guerilla forces in his native coun-
try when he refused to join their numbers.' 8 Although Bolanos had
indicated "'his desire to remain neutral and not be affiliated with
any [Salvadoran] political group' . . . the Immigration Judge, how-
ever, determined that Bolanos had not shown that any danger he
14. See Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Cardoza-Fon-
seca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
15. Rebollo-Jovel v. INS, 794 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Diaz-Esco-
bar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)). In In re Moghar-
rabi, the Board of Immigration Appeals-which under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1992) reviews
the decisions of immigration judges before the Circuit Courts of Appeals-ruled "that an
applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable
person in his circumstances would fear persecution." 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA
1987). In Cuadras v. INS, the Ninth Circuit determined that the "Mogharrabi 'reasona-
ble person' analysis is not inconsistent with the two-pronged test created by Cardoza-
Fonseca ... in that it includes both the subjective and objective inquiries required by
Cardoza-Fonseca." 910 F.2d at 570.
16. See Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1451 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985)); Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984).
17. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, DETERMINATION OF
REFUGEE STATUS 6 (1989).
18. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
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might be subject to would be because of his political opinion." 19
The court of appeals disagreed:
Choosing to remain neutral is no less a political decision than is choosing
to affiliate with a particular political faction. Just as a nation's decision to
remain neutral is a political one, see, e.g., Neutrality Act of 1939, 22
U.S.C. §§ 441-465 (1982), so is an individual's. When a person is aware of
contending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any faction,
that choice is a political choice. A rule that one must identify with one of
two dominant warring political factions in order to possess a political opin-
ion, when many persons may, in fact, be opposed to the views and policies
of both, would frustrate one of the basic objectives of the Refugee Act of
1980--to provide protection to all victims of persecution regardless of
ideology.
20
The court of appeals also rejected the legal relevancy of the gov-
ernment's suggestion that Bolanos may have chosen neutrality for
nonpolitical reasons:
The guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the reasoning process of
those who insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their cause. They
are concerned only with an act that constitutes an overt manifestation of a
political opinion. Persecution because of that overt manifestation is persecu-
tion because of a political opinion.
21
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit decided that Bolanos did possess a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. It
therefore reversed the BIA and granted the Salvadoran asylum in
the United States.22
The author of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bolanos-Hernandez
was Judge Stephen Reinhardt. In the subsequent case of Hernandez-
Ortiz v. INS,23 Judge Reinhardt continued to advance the argument
that neutrality-or even opposition by forbearance, whether actual
or merely perceived-constitutes a political opinion cognizable under
the INA.
Hernandez-Ortiz was a political opponent of the Salvadoran re-
gime whose noncombatant brother and sister-in-law were killed by
Salvadoran security forces, whose grandparents were robbed by Sal-
vadoran soldiers, and whose brother-in-law's wife was abducted and
harassed by Salvadoran national guardsmen.24 In 1983, Hernandez-
19. Id. at 1280.
20. Id. at 1286.
21. Id. at 1287.
22. Id. at 1288. The court of appeals also concluded that there was "a clear
probability that Bolanos would be subject to political persecution if he returned to El
Salvador." Id. The court therefore reversed the BIA and granted Bolanos a withholding
of his deportation pursuant to § 243(h) of the INA. Id.
23. 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
24. Id. at 512.
Ortiz requested the BIA to reopen her deportation proceedings and
grant her political asylum.2 5 The BIA refused to do so, as summa-
rized by the Ninth Circuit:
[T]he Board concluded that she failed to demonstrate that any threat to her
life or freedom was related to her political opinion. The Board based this
conclusion on the fact that Hernandez-Ortiz did not allege that she or any
of her relatives was a member of any political groups or 'had ever partici-
pated in the current conflict in El Salvador.'28
Writing for a unanimous three-person panel of the court of ap-
peals, however, Judge Reinhardt disagreed:
A government does not under ordinary circumstances engage in political
persecution of those who share its ideology, only of those whose views or
philosophies differ, at least in the government's perception. It is irrelevant
whether a victim's political view is neutrality, as in Bolanos-Hernandez, or
disapproval of the acts or opinions of the government. Moreover, it is irrele-
vant whether a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as long as the
government believes that he does .... [W]hen through legally cognizable
inferences or otherwise, an alien establishes a prima facie case that he is
likely to be persecuted because of the government's belief about his views or
loyalties, his actual political conduct, be it silence or affirmative advocacy,
and his actual political views, be they neutrality or partisanship, are irrele-
vant; whatever the circumstances, the persecution is properly categorized as
being "on account of. . . political opinion."
Hernandez-Ortiz has satisfied her burden of establishing for prima facie
case purposes, that the threat to her life or freedom constitutes political
persecution.27
The Ninth Circuit thus reversed the BIA and reopened Hernandez-
Ortiz's deportation case for consideration of her asylum case.28
In his opinion in Hernandez-Ortiz, Judge Reinhardt repeatedly
cited with approval the 1979 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
25. Originally, Hernandez-Ortiz had requested the BIA to reverse the August
1980 decision of an immigration judge deporting her. In October 1982, the BIA dis-
missed her appeal. She then petitioned the court of appeals on November 1, 1982 for
review of the BIA's decision. However, on November 5, 1982, while her petition for
review (which automatically stayed the BIA's order) was pending, Hernandez-Ortiz was
erroneously deported to El Salvador by the United States Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS). The INS then agreed to arrange and pay for her return to the United
States. Id.
In her case before the court of appeals, Hernandez-Ortiz contended, and the Ninth
Circuit accepted, that she had not been "allowed to leave [El Salvador] until she paid a
Salvadoran immigration official approximately $200. According to Hernandez-Ortiz, she
[had] now come to the particular attention of the Salvadoran authorities and they regard
her as a traitor." Id. (footnote omitted).
The court of appeals did not specifically identify Hernandez-Ortiz's unlawful deporta-
tion or the difficult circumstances of her return to the United States as a reason for
reopening her deportation case in 1985. Each fact is mentioned in the court's decision,
however, and each may have played a role in persuading the Ninth Circuit that there
existed a prima facie basis that the threats to Hernandez-Ortiz's life or liberty were
related to political opinion and thus that they should prevent or at least postpone her
second, lawful deportation.
26. Id. at 516.
27. Id. at 517 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 519.
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for Determining Refugee Status of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees,2 9 which he wrote "provides us with some as-
sistance in understanding many concepts related to our immigrations
laws."30 Judge Reinhardt reminded the reader that the Refugee Re-
lief Act of 1980, including its asylum provisions, "amended our im-
migration laws so as to bring United States law into conformity with
international law." 31 Just as the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca
relied on United Nations pronouncements to broaden the scope of "a
well-founded fear of persecution," so the Ninth Circuit in Her-
nandez-Ortiz relied on the same to enlarge the concept of "persecu-
tion on account of ... political opinion."- 2
Bolanos-Hernandez and Hernandez-Ortiz greatly eased the re-
quirement of showing "persecution on account of ... political opin-
ion" in order to obtain asylum in Ninth Circuit deportation cases.
For example, in Turcios v. INS,"3 a Salvadoran national arrested
and beaten by his country's national police was asked at his deporta-
tion hearing, "'Is it correct to say that you would consider yourself
neutral as far as the guerrillas and the Government?' Turcios said
'yes.' "34 The court of appeals found Turcios's testimony to constitute
"an overt manifestation of a political opinion" and remanded his
case to the BIA to exercise its discretion regarding Turcios's section
208(a) asylum claim.35 Then, shortly after Turcios, in Lazo-Majano
29. The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(Handbook) included the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, which the Supreme Court used to
construe § 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
30. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 514 n.3.
31. Id.
32. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on the Handbook continued in Barraza Rivera v.
INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990) in which the court found
ample support for the conclusion that persecution can result from resisting con-
scription for reasons of conscience or refusing to comply with military orders
after induction because they violate standards of human decency .... Accord-
ing to paragraph 167 of the Handbook, punishment for desertion or draft eva-
sion, in itself, does not constitute persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. But
disproportionately severe punishment on account of any of these factors does
constitute persecution .... Most important for our purposes, the Handbook
also advises that an alien may qualify for refugee status after either desertion
or draft evasion if he or she can show that military service would have required
the alien to engage in acts "contrary to basis rules of human conduct."
The Handbook became the Ninth Circuit's preferred instrument for applying interna-
tional law to the asylum provisions of the INA.
33. 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987).
34. Id. at 1401.
35. Id. at 1401, 1403 (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286-87
v. INS,36 the Ninth Circuit lifted entirely from the alien's shoulders
the burden of manifesting something of a political opinion in order to
obtain relief from deportation under the asylum and withholding of
deportations statutes:
Even if she [the alien] had no political opinion and was innocent of a
single reflection on the government of her country, the cynical imputation of
political opinion to her is what counts under both statutes. In deciding
whether anyone has a well-founded fear of persecution or is in danger of
losing life or liberty because of a political opinion, one must continue to
look at the person from the perspective of the persecutor. If the persecutor
thinks the person guilty of a political opinion, then the person is at risk.3
In Beltran-Zavala v. INS,38 the court of appeals cited Lazo-
Majano for the proposition that a Salvadoran possessed a well-
founded fear of political persecution because of the threats to him by
his country's death squads, even though he himself did not hold a
political opinion:
What is determinative here is not that Beltran holds a political opinion, but
rather that the Salvadoran government or, at least, the uncontrollable death
squad has imputed an opinion to Beltran and has persecuted him for that
reason. Political persecution may be based on a political opinion imputed to
the alien.3"
Finally, in Aguilera-Cota v. INS,4" Judge Reinhardt, writing for
the majority of a three-person panel, applied the doctrine of imputed
political opinion to the case of an employee of El Salvador's Central
Board of Elections, with no expressed partisan views, who had re-
ceived an anonymous note warning him to "quit his job or pay the
consequences."41 Judges Reinhardt and Norris concluded that
"Aguilera's status as a government employee caused the opponents
of the government to classify him as a person 'guilty' of a political
opinion."42 They also concluded that "Aguilera's inability to identify
the precise source of the threat [did not] render his fear of prosecu-
tion less justifiable; in fact, an anonymous note may cause even
greater anxiety than a signed one, since in the case of an anonymous
"943threat one cannot identify the potential source of harm ....
In dissent, Judge Stephen Trott agreed with the immigration
judge and the BIA below that Aguilera's story of receiving an anon-
ymous note was less than credible.44 Judge Trott also rejected the
application of the doctrine of implied political opinion, concluding
(9th Cir. 1984)).
36. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 1435.
38. 912 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).
40. 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
41. Id. at 1379.
42. Id. at 1380.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1385 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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that "Aguilera-Cota has not shown that his 'predicament is appreci-
ably different from the dangers faced by all his countrymen.' ,,4r
As is apparent from Judge Trott's dissent in Aguilera-Cota,
chinks in the armor of expansive protection afforded asylum appli-
cants in the Ninth Circuit under the doctrine of imputed political
opinion did appear before the Supreme Court decision in Elias-
Zacarias. Sometimes, a more conservative court of appeals panel ap-
plied the traditional rule that "persecution on account of .. . politi-
cal opinion" can only occur after the affirmative expression of a
political opinion. Thus in Diaz-Escobar v. INS,46 Judges Wallace,
Goodwin, and Choy indicated that the "mere failure to take sides or
even open and vigorous advocacy of neutrality rarely triggers retri-,
bution. That is why nations often find it advantageous to remain
neutral. 14 7 In Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS,48 Judge Wallace, while
writing for the court, was even more derisive of the Bolanos-Her-
nandez line of cases:
We have held that political neutrality is a political opinion, or in other
words, that the absence of a political opinion is a political opinion ....
Other circuits have declined to follow .... Although we have recently
considered the limits appropriate to this potentially expansive theory ...
our precedent allows Arriaga-Barrientos to argue that his complete lack of
an articulated political opinion threatens him with political persecution."9
On behalf of the court, Judge Wallace held that "Arriaga-Bar-
rientos [had] not shown an actual or imputed political opinion for
the purposes of asylum eligibility."5
Nevertheless, the doctrine of imputed political opinion, including
actual and imputed neutrality, continued as the rule in the Ninth
Circuit. The doctrine was applied to the case of an alien fleeing gue-
rilla service in El Salvador and applying for asylum in the United
States in Arteaga v. INS 5 I and Maldonado-Cruz v. Department of
Immigration and Naturalization.2 In Arteaga, the Ninth Circuit
considered the case of a Salvadoran who had been visited by a group
of guerrillas at his home who urged him to join them.5 3 "When
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 1494.
48. 937 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 414.
51. 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
52. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989). The erroneous characterization of the INS as a
cabinet-level department appears in the title of the Maldonado-Cruz decision. It is decid-
edly not the creation of this author.
53. Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1228.
Arteaga refused, stating his intention to remain neutral, the guerril-
las said to him: 'Even if you don't come, we'll get you.' "" The court
therefore concluded that "Arteaga was threatened with kidnapping
or conscripting by the guerrillas if he did not agree to join them
voluntarily." 5 The court also concluded that the threats made
against Arteaga were acts of persecution, notwithstanding that they
had been issued by insurgent rather than government forces. "The
threat of persecution need not come from the government, but may
also come from groups, including anti-government guerrillas, which
the government is 'unwilling or unable to control.' "5 Finally, the
court of appeals determined that Arteaga's refusal to join the guer-
rillas relected his "non-support" for their cause which in turn consti-
tuted an expression of political neutrality-a political opinion under
section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA.5 7
In Maldonado-Cruz, the alien, a former agricultural worker with
no history of political activities or utterances, had been impressed
into service at a guerrilla camp from which he escaped; at his depor-
tation hearing, he claimed political neutrality and expressed fear
that if he returned to El Salvador, he would be killed by either insur-
gent or military forces.58 In a two-to-one opinion (with Judge Wal-
lace dissenting in part),5" the court of appeals panel stated:
This case presents the following legal question: If an alien is forced tojoin a band of guerrillas, but escapes, and the alien then fears persecution
by the guerrillas and by the foreign government's military, is the fear of
persecution on account of "political opinion" within the meaning of 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)? The BIA answered this question in the negative.
We disagree and reverse.
It is true that Maldonado had not aligned himself politically with either
the guerrillas or the military. But we have already noted that "[c]hoosing to
remain neutral is no less a political decision than is choosing to affiliated
with a particular political faction." Bolanos-Hernandez v. LN.S., 767 F.2d
1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Turcios v. LN.S., 821 F.2d 1396, 1401
(9th Cir. 1987).
We hold that Maldonado's fear of persecution by the guerrillas was
based on political opinion. The guerrillas are a political entity. Maldonado's
refusal to join them was a manifestation of his neutrality, which is a recog-
nized political opinion. Del Valle v. LN.S., 776 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir.
1985); Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286. Hence, any persecution by
the guerrillas is a result of Maldonado's expression of his political opinion,
which falls within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)."
Even the Ninth Circuit placed limits on the generous construction
of "a well-founded fear" of "persecution on account of . . . political
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1231.
56. Id. (quoting McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)).
57. Id.
58. Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F.2d 788, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1989).
59. Judge Wallace dissented from the majority's factual determinations regarding
Maldonado's credibility. Id. at 793 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 791.
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opinion" expressed in cases like Arteaga and Maldonado-Cruz. For
example, the court of appeals repeatedly held that a government's
effort to recruit or even to conscript its citizens into military service
generally does not amount to political persecution.61 Also, the court
stated that in assessing a threat against an alien from guerrilla
forces, it would evaluate "'whether the group making the threat
ha[d] the will or the ability to carry it out.' ",62 Nevertheless, the
court of appeals also stated that under Cardoza-Fonseca,6 a "a one-
in-ten chance of the feared event occurring would make the fear
well-founded." 64
IV. THE CASE OF ELIAS-ZACARIAS
A. The Ninth Circuit Decision
Elias-Zacarias v. INS 65 was a decision substantially, if not also
directly, descendant from Bolanos-Hernandez. Like Bolanos, a Sal-
vadoran, Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias was a Central American who
fled his native Guatemala after armed guerrillas had approached
him about joining their ranks.66 Elias refused their advances, and the
guerrillas replied that he should "think it [over] well" after which
they would return.6" Elias, at age eighteen, then entered the United
States without immigration inspection; he was subsequently appre-
hended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed in
deportation proceedings.68
61. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States Dep't of Immigration and Natu-
ralization, 848 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1988); Arteaga v.
INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1988); Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323
(9th Cir. 1986). One of the Circuit Judges responsible for the per curiam opinion in
Kaveh-Haghigy was the Honorable Anthony Kennedy, now an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court and a member of the majority in Elias-Zacarias. See also
Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1990). In Alonzo, the court allowed for the
possibility that a government's move to draft a conscientious objector could constitute
persecution under § 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA provided that (1) the punishment facing
the evading alien was "disproportionately severe," and (2) "the alien ... demonstrates]
that the government knew of his political or religious beliefs and attempted to conscript
him despite those beliefs." Id.
62. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Bolanos-Her-
nandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted)).
63. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
64. Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1232-33. See Rodriguez-Riviera v. United States Dep't
of Immigration and Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1066 (1988).
65. 908 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
66. Id. at 1454.
67. Id. (alteration in original).
68. Id.
At his hearing, Elias conceded deportability and applied for asy-
lum. Both an immigration judge and the BIA found testimony about
why he had left Guatemala to be credible; they nevertheless denied
him relief.69 The BIA concluded, inter alia, that Guatemalan guer-
rillas did not pursue a policy of forced recruitment whatever Elias
might have thought.70
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA and found Elias statu-
torily eligible for asylum. 71 First, the court cited a United States
State Department advisory opinion in the record regarding Elias's
asylum application 71 which referred to "'forced recruitment by op-
posing armed forces'" in the Guatemalan civil conflict. 73 From this
reference, the court concluded that the guerrillas had engaged in
forced recruitment in Guatemala.7 4  "Because nongovernmental
groups lack legitimate authority to conscript persons into their ar-
mies, their acts of conscription are tantamount to kidnapping and
constitute persecution. ' 75 The court of appeals then categorized the
persecution as "'on account of political opinion,' because the person
resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile
to the persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out
69. Id. at 1454 n.3.
70. Id. at 1457.
71. Id. at 1461. The court reversed the BIA's conclusion on the asylum issue, but
it left undisturbed the Board's denial of Elias's request for a withholding of his deporta-
tion under § 243(h) of the INA. "To show that forced recruitment was more than a
reasonable possibility, Elias needed to present more specific evidence concerning the ex-
tent of forced recruitment by the guerrillas, either in the country at large or as it affected
him, members of his family or other people whom he knew. Cf. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767
F.2d at 1280." Id.
The court also affirmed the BIA's denial of Elias's motion to reopen his case on the
basis of new evidence-i.e., a letter from the alien's father, "saying that guerrillas had
returned to the [family] house two times after Elias had fled (and after the time of the
hearing) and that they had asked for Elias and his father both times." Id. at 1458-59.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Elias-Zacarias was therefore less expansive than its
grants of relief in Bolanos-Hernandez, Arleaga, and Maldonado-Cruz, in which the
aliens were found eligible for both asylum and withholding of deportation. Nevertheless,
it was in Elias-Zacarias that the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and cur-
tailed its generous interpretation of the asylum laws.
72. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.11(a) (1992), the State Department's Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs "may comment on an application" for asylum
it receives from INS or the immigration judge in the course of exclusion and deportation
proceedings.
73. -Elias-Zacarias, 908 F.2d at 1455.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1456 (footnote and citations omitted). In Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Cir-
cuit described as "legal error" the failure of the State Department in its advisory opinion
to categorize the forced recruitment of persons by guerrilla forces as persecution. Id. at
1456 n.5. It was only one page earlier that the court had relied on that same advisory
opinion to reverse the BIA's conclusion that the Guatemalan guerrillas did not engage in
forced recruitment.
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the kidnapping is political. 76 Once again, the Ninth Circuit em-
ployed the doctrine of imputed political opinion to find political per-
secution in an asylum case.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court in reversing the Ninth Circuit by a six-to-
three vote did not regard Elias's plight as desperately or as politi-
cally as the court of appeals. This is seen from the statement of facts
in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Scalia, in which the findings
of the immigration judge (who had denied asylum) were quoted, not
paraphrased:
The Immigration Judge summarized Elias-Zacarias' testimony as follows:
"[A]round the end of January in 1987 [when Elias-Zacarias was
eighteen], two armed, uniformed guerrillas with handkerchiefs cover-
ing part of their faces came to his home. Only he and his parents
were there .... [T]he guerrillas asked his parents and himself to join
with them, but they all refused. The guerrillas asked them why and
told them that they would be back, and that they should think it over
about joining them.
"[Elias-Zacarias] did not want to join the guerrillas because the
guerrillas are against the government and he was afraid that the gov-
ernment would retaliate against him and his family if he did join the
guerrillas. [H]e left Guatemala at the end of March [1987] . . . be-
cause he was afraid that the guerrillas would return."
The Immigration Judge understood from this testimony that Elias-
Zacarias' request for asylum and for withholding of deportation was "based
on this one attempted recruitment by the guerrillas.""
The Supreme Court thus highlighted that (1) Elias's confrontation
with the guerrillas was a non-violent, one-time event, (2) his political
opinions (as distinct from his fear of government reprisals) were not
evident from the record of his deportation proceedings, and (3) his
parents (whose services were also solicited) remained alive and well
during the pendency of those proceedings.18 Given the view of the
evidence presented in Mr. Justice Scalia's majority opinion, it is not
76. Id. at 1456 (citations omitted).
77. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 814-15 (1992) (emphasis added).
78. It should be remembered that in his motion to reopen his deportation proceed-
ings before the BIA, Elias offered the letter of his father-dated after the former's de-
parture from Guatemala-describing another two visits by guerrillas to the family home.
See Elias-Zacarias, 908 F.2d at 1458-59. See also supra note 71. Apparently, the Su-
preme Court majority considered the continued interest of the guerrillas in the Elias
family less critical than the continued survival of the parents under those very
circumstances.
surprising that the conclusions of the Supreme Court differed mark-
edly from those of the Ninth Circuit:
The C6urt of Appeals found reversal warranted. In its view, a guerrilla
organization's attempt to conscript a person into its military forces necessa-
rily constitutes "persecution on account of . . . political opinion," because
"the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion
hostile to the persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out
the kidnapping is political." 921 F.2d, at 850. The first half of this seems to
us untrue, and the second half irrelevant.
Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might resist recruit-
ment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to remain with one's
family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian life, to mention
only a few. The record in the present case not only failed to show a political
motive on Elias-Zacarias' part; it showed the opposite. He testified that he
refused to join the guerrillas because he was afraid that the government
would retaliate against him and his family if he did so. Nor is there any
indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas errone-
ously believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based.
As for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the guerrillas' "motive in
carrying out the kidnapping is political": It apparently meant by this that
the guerrillas seek to fill their ranks in order to carry on their war against
the government and pursue their political goals. See 921 F.2d, at 850 (cit-
ing Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d at 1227, 1232, n.8 (CA9 1988)); 921 F.2d, at
852. But that does not render the forced recruitment "persecution on ac-
count of . . . political opinion." . . . The ordinary meaning of the phrase
"persecution on account of ... political opinion" in § 101 (a)(42) is persecu-
tion on account of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's. If a
Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of lan-
guage, engaging in persecution on account of political opinion; and if a fun-
damentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not engaging in
persecution on account of religion. Thus, the mere existence of a genera-
lized "political" motive underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment is in-
adequate to establish (and, indeed, goes far to refute) the proposition that
Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion, as§ 101(a)(42) requires.
Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides with any political
faction is itself the affirmative expression of a political opinion. That seems
to us not ordinarily so ....
Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to provide direct proof
of his persecutors' motives. We do not require that. But since the statute
makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or cir-
cumstantial ....
The BIA's determination should therefore have been upheld in all re-
spects, and we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment to the contrary.79
In short, the Supreme Court majority dealt a firm, if not fatal,
blow to the doctrine of imputed political opinion applied by the
Ninth Circuit from the time of Bolanos-Hernandez and Hernandez-
Ortiz (and the writings there of Judge Reinhardt) to the cases of
Arteaga, Maldonado-Cruz, and, of course, Zacarias. No longer
would a persecutor's inference (or a judicial inference, as Mr. Justice
Scalia's opinion suggests) of political opinion suffice. An asylum ap-
plicant would have to demonstrate both some affirmative expression
of political opinion on his part and a nexus between this and the
79. 112 S. Ct. at 815-17.
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persecution he fears.80
Thus, in Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court adopted what had
been minority views of Ninth Circuit Judge Wallace that the ab-
sence of an expressed position is not equivalent with political neu-
trality and that a "complete lack of an articulated political opinion"
is not demonstrative of the manifestation of political opinion re-
quired by section 101 (a)(42)(A) of the INA.8 '
In their dissenting opinion in Elias-Zacarias, Justices Stevens,
Blackmun, and O'Connor defended Judge Reinhardt's Ninth Circuit
majority opinion in Bolanos-Hernandez and with it the argument
that opposition by forbearance is political opinion:
A political opinion can be expressed negatively as well as affirmatively. A
refusal to support a cause-by staying home on election day, by refusing to
take an oath of allegiance, or by refusing to step forward at an induction
center-can express a political opinion as effectively as an affirmative state-
ment or affirmative conduct. Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing
more than a simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with one's
family, it is the kind of political expression that the asylum provisions of the
statute were intended to protect.
82
For the Supreme Court majority, however, the aim of "living an
ordinary life" did not differentiate Elias from the rest of the Guate-
malan population. Thus, his predicament was not appreciably differ-
ent from the dangers faced by his fellow countrymen, and therefore
not a proper basis for granting political asylum.8 3
V. POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT AFTER
ELIAS-ZACARIAS 8 4
The uncertain effect of Elias-Zacarias on future Ninth Circuit
adjudications in political asylum cases may be gleaned from the
80. For example, a communist citizen of a country under rightist or non-commu-
nist rule who was arrested on a criminal charge and tortured in prison would have to
show that he had been disproportinately mistreated by the authorities because of his
political opinion. He would therefore have to demonstrate that his communist views were
known and important to the authorities at the time of his mistreatment. See Blanco-
Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. See Arriaga-Barrentos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1991). See
supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
82. 112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens, Blackmun, & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
83. See Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir. 1990) (Trott, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
84. The BIA quickly embraced and reiterated the Supreme Court's Elias-Zacarias
decision in In re R-O-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 3170 (1992). According to the BIA, the victim of
forced guerrilla recruitment "must show that he is being persecuted on account of his
political opinion, and that his persecution is not solely the result of the guerrillas' aim in
seeking to fill their ranks in order to carry out their war with the government and pursue
matter of Canas-Segovia v. INS. 5 In its 1990 ruling, the court of
appeals reversed the conclusions of the BIA and an immigration
judge, that El Salvador's policy of mandatory military service for all
males ages eighteen to thirty years old amounted to "persecution on
account of . . . religion ...and political opinion" under the INA
when applied to Jehovah's Witnesses.86 On the question of political
opinion, the Ninth Circuit in 1990 declared that "[tihe Canases' re-
fusal to do military service because of their religious beliefs also nec-
essarily places them in a position of political neutrality in the
Salvadoran civil conflict." '1 7
In its July 1992 decision, the Ninth Circuit conceded that "[i]n
light of Elias-Zacarias's adoption of a motive requirement, Canas-
Segovia can no longer prove religious persecution." 88 However, the
court of appeals stubbornly sought to reconcile its finding of political
persecution in Canas-Segovia with the reversal it suffered in Elias-
Zacarias:
Imputed political opinion is still a valid basis for relief after Elias-
Zacarias. The [Supreme] Court made clear that evidence of motive is re-
quired, but imputed political opinion, by definition, includes an element of
motive. A persecutor falsely attributes an opinion to the victim, and then
persecutes the victim because of that mistaken belief about the victim's
views ....
We held in the original opinion that the Canas-Segovias were entitled to
relief based on the theory of imputed political opinion. Nothing in Elias-
Zacarias changes our analysis. Jose [Canas] is entitled to relief on this
basis.8"
The Ninth Circuit's 1992 decision in Canas-Segovia is a curious
one. On one hand, it denies that draft resisters who had a credible
record of practicing the faith of Jehovah's Witnesses and who faced
imprisonment for their conscientious objection were the victims of
religious persecution. On the other hand, the court of appeals found
that these same religious dissidents were the victims of political per-
secution, notwithstanding that they have no history of political activ-
ity. It is problematic whether in deciding Elias-Zacarias Mr. Justice
their political goal, their political motive being irrelevant." Id. slip op. at 6 (citation
omitted).
85. 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992), remanding 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d at 720, 727-28. In its 1990 decision, the Court of
Appeals criticized the BIA for requiring "the Canases to demonstrate intent or motive to
persecute on the part of the Salvadoran government." Id. at 727. The court cited the
Handbook, at paragraph 197, for suggesting "that the 'requirement of evidence should
not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situa-
tion in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.'" Id. at 727 n.20. By con-
trast, the Supreme Court, in its decision in Elias-Zacarias, never once relied on the
Handbook.
87. Id. at 728 (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (9th
Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted)).
88. Canas-Segovia, 970 F.2d at 601.
89. Id. at 601-02 (citations omitted).
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Scalia and company intended to have the effect they did on the out-
come of a case like Canas-Segovia. It is also problematic whether
the Ninth Circuit's most recent ruling in Canas-Segovia will with-
stand appeal to the Supreme Court, should one be taken by the
United States Department of Justice. Finally, it is highly problem-
atic indeed whether we at the bar and bench have heard the last
word in the debate over defining "persecution on account of ... po-
litical opinion" under the INA.

